EMPLOYMENT "BY THE BOOK" IN NEW
JERSEY: WOOLLEY AND ITS PROGENY
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INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.' and held that, under certain conditions,
provisions in an employee manual may create an implied contract
not to terminate employment except for good cause. 2 The Woolley decision has, in some cases, significantly altered the relationship between employers and employees. 3 Further, while Woolley
resolved whether an employee manual may ever give rise to an
employment contract, it left a host of other questions unanswered. 4 This article analyzes the effects of Woolley on NewJersey
employment law and how federal and state courts, applying New
Jersey law, have addressed the questions left unanswered in

Woolley.
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1 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
2 Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269-70.
3 See, e.g., Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 117, 570 A.2d
903, 917 (1990) (declining to apply Woolley retroactively because it "made fundamentally new law"). Writing for the court in Grigoletti, Justice Handler observed:
Woolley took a quantum leap forward in holding that contractual obligations could be implied in fact from an employment manual, and
gave such manuals and similar employer policies a legal significance
not theretofore found. The decision forever changed the balance of
power between certain employers and their at-will employees. After
Woolley, such employers no longer possessed the virtually unfettered
freedom to terminate at-will employees.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Michael A. Chagares, Comment, Limiting the Employment-at-Will Rule:
EnforcingPolicy ManualPromises Through UnilateralContractAnalysis, 16 SETON HALL L.
REV. 465, 489-90 (1986) (noting that Woolley created various new issues including
when and to what effect an employment manual could be revised by the employer
and whether Woolley was to be applied retroactively).
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THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL RULE

The general rule in New Jersey is that the employment relationship is terminable at the will of either the employer or the
employee, unless the employer and employee have an agreement
that states otherwise.' As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted,
"[a]n employer can fire an at-will employee for no specific reason
6
or simply because an employee is bothering the boss."1 Of
course, there are statutory and common law exceptions to the
employment at-will rule. An employer may not terminate an employee for a reason that would violate state or federal anti-discrimination laws. 7 Nor may an employer terminate an employee
for the sole purpose of preventing the employee from attaining a
right to pension plan benefits. 8 Further, an employer may not
5 See, e.g., Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 561, 569 A.2d 793,
804 (1990) ("A 'contentious' 'at-will' employee can be fired for a false cause or no
cause at all. That firing may be unfair but it is not illegal."); English v. College of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 73 N.J. 20, 23, 372 A.2d 295, 297 (1977)
("At common law an employer had the unbridled authority to discharge, with or
without cause, an employee in the absence of contractual [or] statutory restrictions."); Schlenk v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 1 N.J. 131, 135, 62 A.2d 380, 381
(1948) ("Equity has no inherent jurisdiction over the relation of employer and employee. Each is free, in the absence of contract or statute, to discontinue the relation at will, with or without cause."); Hindle v. Morrison Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super.
75, 81, 223 A.2d 193, 196 (App. Div. 1966) ("[Iln the absence of a contract, an
employment, unless otherwise specified, is generally at will and subject to termination with or without cause."); Piechowski v. Matarese, 54 NJ. Super. 333, 344, 148
A.2d 872, 878 (App. Div. 1959) (Absent a statute, contract or other agreement,
employment is typically an at-will relationship which may be terminated with or
without cause.). See also Chagares, supra note 4, at 469-70 (discussing the genesis of
the employment at will rule).
6 Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 NJ. 189, 191, 536 A.2d 237, 238
(1988).
7 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (prohibiting employment discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or pregnancy); Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1988) (prohibiting age discrimination); NewJersey Law
Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-28 (West 1976 & Supp.
1991) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, sex, age, handicap,
national origin or sexual preference); N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:6B-1 (prohibiting the making of employment decisions based upon whether an employee does or does not
smoke or use tobacco products "unless the employer has a rational basis for doing
so which is reasonably related to employment"); Conscientious Employee Protection Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (protecting certain "whistleblowers"). See also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C.A. § 12101 to 12213 (West Supp. 1991) (federal statute prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities, employment title effective July 26,
1992).
8 Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) [hereinafter ERISA].
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terminate an employee where the "discharge is contrary to a
clear mandate of public policy." 9
Unlike these statutory and judicial exceptions, Woolley is not
an abrogation of the employment at-will presumption, but rather
a recognition that, as always, the employer and employee are free
to contract for terms and conditions of employment, such as termination only "for cause."' 1 Where Woolley broke new ground
was in its use of unilateral contract analysis to determine that employee manual provisions concerning job security and termination procedure could constitute an offer to contract which an
employee could accept through continued employment.
II.

THE WOOLLEY DECISION

Richard Woolley (Woolley) commenced employment with
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. (Hoffmann-La Roche) in 1969. In December, 1969, Hoffmann-La Roche issued to Woolley a copy of
the Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. Personnel Policy Manual. This
manual provided, in part, that "[it is the policy of Hoffmann-La
Roche to retain to the extent consistent with company requirements, the services of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effectively."" The manual also devoted five pages
to "termination," and specifically defined five types of terminations: (1) "layoff;" (2) "discharge due to performance;" (3) "discharge, disciplinary;" (4) "retirement;" and (5) "resignation."12
Significantly, the manual did not include a category for "discharge without cause." The manual also included a detailed pro9 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). The
Pierce court specifically reaffirmed the vitality of the employment at-will rule, noting
that as a result "employers will know that unless they act contrary to public policy,
they may discharge employees at will for any reason." Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
1o See McQuitty v. General Dynamics Corp., 204 N.J. Super. 514, 520, 499 A.2d
526, 529 (App. Div. 1985) ("Woolley is not... 'an exception to the at-will doctrine'
...but, rather, a recognition of basic contract principles concerning acceptance of
unilateral contracts.") (citation omitted); Piechowski v. Matarese, 54 N.J. Super.
333, 344, 148 A.2d 872, 878 (App. Div. 1959) ("In the absence of a contract or
statute, an employment, unless otherwise specified, is generally at will and subject
to termination with or without cause." (emphasis added)). Because Woolley did not

abrogate the at-will rule, the Woolley court's criticism of the rule appears somewhat
superfluous. Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 290-92, 491 A.2d
1257, 1260-62, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). This is especially so in

light of the NewJersey Supreme Court's post-Woolley decisions reaffirming the vitality of the at-will rule. See Erickson v. Marsh & McClennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 560,

569 A.2d 793, 804 (1990); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 191,
536 A.2d 237, 238 (1988).
II Woolley, 99 N.J. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259.
12 Id.
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cedure entitled "Guidelines for Discharge Due to Performance,"
which was to be followed prior to discharging an employee for
cause.
In May, 1978, Hoffmann-La Roche requested Woolley's resignation, citing a loss of confidence in his abilities. After Woolley
twice refused to resign, he was terminated inJuly, 1978. Woolley
subsequently filed suit, claiming, inter alia, that the employee
manual created a contract that contemplated discharge only for
cause, and then only after the manual's termination procedures
were followed.' 3 The trial court granted Hoffmann-La Roche's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the manual was not
contractually binding and that Woolley's employment was terminable at will. The appellate court affirmed.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded. Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the court, applied a
unilateral contract analysis and directed the trial court upon remand to consider the manual's job security provisions as binding
unless the manual prominently and unmistakenly indicated that
those provisions were not binding, or unless there was other similar proof that established Hoffman-La Roche's intent not to be
bound. "

Initially, the court distinguished-but did not overruleprior cases such as Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co. '5 in which the court
had declined to enforce a purported oral "lifetime" employment
contract. Chief Justice Wilentz observed that Savarese t6 involved
a contract with a specific employee, not a general agreement that
applied to all employees. The Woolley court noted that while a
"lifetime" contract purported to protect the employee against
any termination, the employee manual "contract" protected the
13 Woolley had also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, but consented to the dismissal of those claims. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
14 The record before the supreme court contained only eight pages of the manual. Id. at 298 n.7, 491 A.2d at 1265 n.7. Therefore, the court did not know the
nature and extent of other areas covered in the employee manual and whether the
rest of the manual was consonant with terms that the court deduced from the eight
pages before it.
15 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952).
16 Id. In Savarese, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
Agreements of this nature have not been upheld except where it most
convincingly appears it was the intent of the parties to enter into such
long-range commitments and they must be clearly, specifically and
definitely expressed. Only then is it grudgingly conceded that not all
such contracts are "so vague and indefinite as to time as to be void
and unenforceable because of uncertainty or indefiniteness."
Id. at 601, 89 A.2d at 240 (citations omitted).
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employee only from arbitrary termination.' 7
After concluding that Savarese did not dispose of Woolley's
claim, the court found that the termination clauses of the manual
could constitute an offer. In making this determination, the
court not only examined the specific manual provisions at issue,
but also stressed the context of the manual's preparation and distribution. Although it appeared that the manual was not distributed to all employees, the court nevertheless concluded, that
Hoffman-La Roche intended that all employees be advised of the
benefits conferred by the manual, absent contradictory evidence. 8 The supreme court also found it significant that the
manual was the single document given to the employees that purported to establish the employment terms and conditions. Moreover, the manual was carefully drafted and prepared by the
company with all of the indicia of corporate legitimacy. The
court emphasized that the mere fact of distribution suggested the
manual's importance.' 9
The second factor the court considered in finding that the
manual constituted an offer was the specific manual provisions.
17 Curiously, the Woolley court failed to note that Savarese indicated that even a
"lifetime" contract may be terminated by the employer for cause, such as unsatisfactory employee performance. Id., 89 A.2d at 239-40 (citations omitted). See also
Alter v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., 234 N.J. Super. 409, 416, 560 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Ch. Div.
1989) ("lifetime contracts, even where upheld, only preclude a discharge 'without
cause' "). The court emphasized, however, that the duration of a contract arising
from a manual is indefinite. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 301 n.8, 491 A.2d at 1266 n.8. Justice Wilentz enumerated several examples of when an employee manual contract
ordinarily may be terminated:
[W]hen the employee's performance is inadequate; when business circumstances require a general reduction in the employment force, the
positions eliminated including that of plaintiff; when those same circumstances require the elimination of employees performing a certain
function, for instance, for technological reasons, and plaintiff performed such functions; when business conditions require a general
reduction in salary, a reduction which brings plaintiff's pay below that
which he is willing to accept; or when any change, including the cessation of business, requires the elimination of plaintiff's position, an
elimination made in good faith in pursuit of legitimate business objectives: all of these terminations . . . are ordinarily contemplated in a
contract arising from a manual, although the list does not purport to
be exhaustive.
Id.
18 The court suggested that it was somewhat handicapped by the state of the
record concerning, inter alia, the extent of the manual's distribution, but nevertheless assumed that Hoffmann-LaRoche intended to publish the manual's contents to
all employees. Wooley, 99 N.J. at 298 n.7, 491 A.2d at 1265 n.7. This assumption
was critical to the court's holding. See id.
19 Id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
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The chief justice wrote that unless the manual's language were
such that "no one could reasonably have thought it was intended
to create legally binding obligations," the manual's termination
provisions would be deemed to be an obligation undertaken by
Hoffman-La Roche.2 ° In this regard, the court relied upon the
comprehensive and definite nature of the manual's termination
and job security provisions, as well as an explicit introductory
"policy" statement which asserted that Hoffmann-La Roche's
policy was not to fire any employee who was doing a good job.
Indeed, the court held that even if other manual provisions regarding other aspects of the employment relationship, such as
duration, wages, hours of work and the precise services to be rendered were so indefinite as to cause problems of interpretation,
such problems would not render the termination provisionswhich the court concluded were "explicit and clear"unenforceable. 2 '
After determining that the manual's termination provisions
could be construed as an offer, 2 2 Chief Justice Wilentz next addressed the issues of acceptance and consideration. The court
concluded that the job security provisions in an employee manual which was "widely distributed" throughout a large employee
workforce, were supported by consideration and might therefore
be enforced as binding. Observing that the acceptance depended "on what the promisor had bargained for," the court
deemed it "reasonable" to interpret the manual "as seeking continued work from the employees. . . ." As such, the court construed the manual to be an offer seeking formation of a unilateral
contract-in effect, a promise ofjob security in exchange for continued work by the employees. The court further held that, given
the circumstances, reliance by the employees upon the manual's
promise was to be presumed.23
Id.
Id. at 305-06, 491 A.2d at 1269. It is clear that viable contractual claims cannot be made regarding conditions of employment which are not expressed in definite terms in a manual, although the Woolley court did not explicitly address this
issue. See Savarese, 9 N.J. at 599, 89 A.2d at 237 (citation omitted) ("To be enforceable.., a contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the performances to
be rendered by each party can be reasonably ascertained.").
22 The court did not hold that the manual constituted an offer as a matter of law,
but stated that ajury could so find. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 301, 491 A.2d at 1266. Later
in the opinion, however, Chief Justice Wilentz suggested that such a jury determination might be unnecessary, stating "[a]s we view the matter, it may very well be
that the court can make all of the determinations required." Id. at 307 n.13, 491
A.2d at 1270 n.13.
23 The court explained that the presumption of reliance resulted in a binding
20
21
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The court advised that even where the circumstances of the
manual's preparation and distribution and the specific manual
provision rendered the manual capable of being construed as a
binding contract, employers could avoid any legal obligation in
one of several ways, including by inserting an appropriate disclaimer "in a very prominent position. "24
The Woolley court specifically left certain issues unresolved.
Because Woolley's employment was not for a fixed term, the
court did not evaluate the impact of a job security clause where
employment is alleged to be for fixed term. The court also expressed no opinion as to whether or to what extent an employee
manual could be modified to adversely affect a binding job security provision. The court also left open the damage issue, asserting that damages were difficult to assess in such cases. 25 As
discussed in Part IV, a number of other questions, although not
specifically identified by the Woolley court, also were left for later
courts to resolve.
III.

QUESTIONS

RAISED BUT NOT ANSWERED IN WOOLLEY: THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

A.

Introduction

Courts applying the Woolley decision have recognized and resolved a number of questions left open by the supreme court.
Post-Woolley decisions have affirmed that Woolley did not abrogate
the employment "at-will" rule, that not every expression of employer policy or procedure constitutes a contract, and that even
where an employer issues a handbook that gives rise to a Woolleytype contract, the employer still retains substantial freedom to
job security provision as soon as the manual was distributed. Id. at 304-05 n. 10, 491
A.2d at 1268 n.10.
24 Id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
25 Noting that Woolley had died prior to oral argument, the court assumed that
the calculation would require, at a minimum, a comparison between the salary
Woolley received up until his death and the salary he would have received had he
remained employed by Hoffmann-LaRoche. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 308, 491 A.2d at
1270. The court also initially held that the issue of whether "good cause" existed
for the termination would not be tried on remand because Hoffmann-La Roche had
not complied with the manual's termination provisions. Id. at 307-08, 491 A.2d at
1269-70. The supreme court subsequently modified this part of the decision and
permitted Hoffmann-La Roche to attempt to prove on remand that it (1) followed
the termination provisions and (2) had good cause to discharge Woolley. Woolley
v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 101 N.J. 10, 10-11, 499 A.2d 515, 515 (1985). Hoffmann-La Roche had conceded these points only for the purposes of its summary
judgment motion. Id.
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set the terms and conditions of employment, so long as the employer follows its own widely-distributed policies. While other
issues remain, Woolley and its progeny provide significant guidance on how such issues should be resolved.
B.

Extent of Distribution

The circumstances surrounding the distribution of the Hoffmann-La Roche employee manual figured prominently in the
Woolley court's decision. 26 Indeed, ChiefJustice Wilentz acknowl27
edged that such a finding was central to the court's reasoning.
Regardless of the language in a manual or other policy statement, the document clearly will not have any legal significance
under Woolley unless it has been "widely distributed among a
large workforce. ' ' 28 The court failed to specify, however, to what
extent a manual must be distributed to be considered binding.
In Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino,2 9 the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, applying Wooley, held that an em26 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297-99, 491 A.2d at 1264-65. Faced with a "somewhat
meager record" that did not answer all of the important questions, the court made
certain assumptions to reach its holding:
[The manual's] terms are of such importance to all employees that in
the absence of contradicting evidence, it would seem clear that it was
intended by Hoffmann-La Roche that all employees be advised of the
benefits it confers.
We take judicial notice of the fact that Hoffmann-La Roche is a
substantial company with many employees in New Jersey. The record
permits the conclusion that the policy manual represents the most reliable statement of the terms of their employment.... [Wlithout minimizing the importance of its specific provisions, the context of the manual's
preparation and distribution is, to us, the most persuasive proof that
it would be almost inevitable for an employee to regard it as a binding
commitment.... Having been employed ...without any individual
employment contract, by an employer whose good reputation made it
so attractive, the employee is given this one document that purports to set
forth the terms and conditions of his employment .... The mere fact
of the manual's distributionsuggests its importance.
Id. at 298-99, 491 A.2d at 1265 (emphasis added). The court further acknowledged
that "we shall assume that the manual's origin, dissemination, and continued existence is similar in context to that of the ordinary personnel policy manual, of which
context we take judicial notice." Id. at 298 n.7, 491 A.2d at 1265 n.7 (emphasis
added).
27 ChiefJustice Wilentz wrote that "[in determining the manual's meaning and
effect, we must consider the probable context in which it was disseminated and the
environment surrounding its continued existence." Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265
(emphasis added).
28 Apparently, a document distributed to a small workforce might not give rise to
a Woolley contract, although no New Jersey court has considered this question.
29 231 N.J. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1989).
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ployer's policy manuals created a contractual agreement to discharge only for cause, partly because of the manuals' widespread
distribution among, and their application to, the workforce."s
Clearly, however, an employer's document that merely "covers"
all employees is insufficient to give rise to a Woolley contract.
Many employer policy statements apply to virtually all employees, yet are not necessarily "widely distributed" throughout the
workforce. Where distribution is not "widespread" or the plaintiff has not been supplied with a copy of the document at issue,
state and federal courts have held that such documents cannot
form the basis of a Woolley breach of contract claim.
For instance, in Ware v. PrudentialInsurance Co. , the appellate court rejected a Woolley claim premised upon a document entitled "Guide for Vice-Presidents, Regional Marketing" that was
not widely distributed. The Ware court noted that copies of the
guide were sent only to certain high level executives and/or their
assistants and that neither the plaintiff nor any other employee at
his level received a copy of the document. The Ware court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the manual to establish a Woolley
employment contract because, inter alia, the manual had not been
widely distributed among the employer's workforce. s
Citing Ware, the appellate court in House v. Carter-Wallace,
30 Id. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15. Other factors that the Preston court found determinative were:
[T]he required reading and signing of the employee handbooks; the
provision of a progressive scheme of discipline for the enumerated
types of prohibited conduct; the testimony of Claridge's Executive Director of Human Resources that it was Claridge's general policy to
terminate employees only for cause, and, most importantly, the various representations of "maximum job security."
Id. See also infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
31 220 N.J. Super. 135, 531 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 335,
550 A.2d 450 (1988).
32 The court specifically held:
The limited distribution and obvious internal management objectives
of the Guide is a further reason for concluding that plaintiff and other
employees of defendant could not have had a "reasonable expectation" that the document was intended to confer "employee benefits."
... No copy was sent to plaintiff or any other employee at his level of
management. Nor does the record indicate that there was any organized program to disseminate the contents of the document to employees other than those to whom it was sent.
Id. at 144-45, 531 A.2d at 761. The court also relied on an individual, specific
agreement that Ware had signed with the employer stipulating that the employment was at will.
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Inc.,3 3 held that no reasonable expectation of job security could

be created based upon a document which had not been distributed to the employees. In so holding, the court noted that the
internal company memorandum relied upon by the employee
had not been widely distributed throughout the company. Moreover, even if the provisions were binding, the court found that
the document's termination procedures had been followed. 4
Similarly, in Labus v. Navistar International Transport Corp.,35 the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey determined that a manual which the plaintiff never saw and that was
distributed "only to certain upper-level employees" could not
form the basis of a Woolley claim. The court specifically held that
there could be no reasonable reliance upon a promise in a manual that the plaintiff never saw.3 6
Where the document at issue was intended only to be used
by supervisors in helping them manage their subordinates, courts
have held that no Woolley promise is created.3 7 Often an employer will distribute two manuals: one for employees generally
and one for managers. The managerial guide is typically more
detailed and is intended to guide supervisors in their application
of company guidelines. In such cases, courts will not allow recovery under a Woolley theory based upon the managerial guide both
because, by its nature, the guide is considered an "internal" document and because, in the words of Woolley, it is the more widely
distributed handbook that is the "most reliable statement of the
33 232 N.J. Super. 42, 556 A.2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564
A.2d 874 (1989).
34 Id. at 55, 556 A.2d at 360 (citing Ware, 220 N.J. Super. at 144-46, 531 A.2d at
761-62). The House court's finding that the document was never "distributed" to
the plaintiff suggests that the employer must intend to place the document into the
employee's hands and that it is insufficient that an employee may have actually seen
or had access to the document. Thus, for example, a secretary for a human resources manager might have knowledge of numerous internal policy documents,
but cannot rely upon those documents to support a Woolley claim because the documents were not "distributed" to the secretary. See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 293, 491 A.2d
at 1262 ("Here . . .we have the knowing distribution of an apparently carefully
thought-out policy manual intended to cover all employees .. ") (emphasis added). See also Morrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at
14-15 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991) (employer's intent with respect to distribution of internal corporate manual controls).
35 740 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1990).
36 Id. at 1062; see also Callahan v. Pioneer Communications of Am., No. A-344088T5, slip op. at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 3, 1989) (holding that because
"plaintiff did not receive the handbook until after his employment commenced,"
he could not "have relied on it as defining the terms and conditions of his job").
37 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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terms of the [employees'] employment." '
Internal company
manuals are simply not the type of document that Woolley intended to enforce.3 9
The "widespread distribution" requirement of Woolley is in
accord with basic contract law that an offer cannot be legally
binding unless communicated to an intended recipient. 40 Moreover, even if a paticular employee has in fact received the
document upon which he is relying, the employee still must show
widespread distribution in order to recover under its
provisions."'
Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298-99, 491 A.2d at 1265.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at
15 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991) ("It seems clear that the manual that Prudential intended
to use to inform its workforce of employment benefits was not the [supervisory]
Administrative Manual, but rather was the [employee's] manual entitled "You and
the Prudential" which was in fact distributed to all employees."); Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 135, 146, 531 A.2d 757, 762 (App. Div. 1987), certif
denied, 113 N.J. 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988) ("The fact that defendant did not distribute the [supervisory] Guide to plaintiff but rather gave him a different guide
which is silent with respect to the employment rights of managers also indicates
that the intent of the Guide-as well as other policy guides issued by defendant-is
solely to delineate management responsibilities."); Mills v. Thomas & Betts Corp.,
Civ. No. 87-983 (D.NJ. Sept. 14, 1987), aff'd, No. 87-5731, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir.
Mar. 11, 1988) (the limited distribution manager's manual "was not the type of
manual the Woolley court held to be contractually binding").
In Mills, the court distinguished an ordinary employee handbook given to all
employees from a "headquarters" type publication of limited distribution. Mills,
Civ. No. 87-983, slip op. at 22-23. The court held that only the general, widely
disseminated employee handbook was similar to "that which the Woolley court
termed the [contractually binding] 'ordinary personnel policy manual.' " Id. at 23.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming summary judgment for the employer, expressly approved of the lower court's analysis. Mills, No. 87-5731, slip
op. at 3.
40 See Soloffv. Josephson, 21 N.J. Super. 106, 109-10, 90 A.2d 891, 893 (App.
Div. 1952) ("Basic requirements of an informal contract are a valuable consideration and a manifestation of mutual assent by the parties thereto ....
Mutual assent
usually takes the form of an offer, which must be communicated to the offeree, and
an acceptance thereof by the latter, either by words or conduct.")(citations omitted); IA CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs § 59 (1963) ("There is no power of acceptance by
one to whom the offer is wholly unknown."); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CoNrlTRcTs § 33 (3d ed. 1957) ("An offeree cannot actually assent to an
offer unless he knows of its existence."). Cf. Woolley, 99 N.J. at 304-05 n.10, 491
A.2d at 1268 n. 10 (although reliance on handbook provisions will be presumed, the
manual provisions become binding when the manual is distributed; this suggests
that employees need not receive or know of the manual so long as widespread distribution is made). The implications of this aspect of the Woolley rule for an employer who wishes to issue a revised manual are discussed infra notes 151-55 and
accompanying text.
41 Morrison, Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at 15-16 n.8. In Morrison, the employer set
forth progressive discipline guidelines in an internal manual that was not distributed to employees at the plaintiff's level. The plaintiff and several other supervi38
39
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When Does a Statement in An Employer Document Constitute a
Promise?

Much post-Woolley litigation has centered on the nature of
the employer statements in a manual that may give rise to an implied promise of job security. To be legally binding Woolley required that a widely disseminated manual must, "when fairly
read, provide[] that certain benefits are an incident of the employment (including, especially, job security provisions) ... "
Commitment, that is, evidence of an actual promise, must be
present within the document.43 The focus is on the employer's
objective manifestation of intent and, therefore, an employee's
subjective belief that he was the beneficiary of a promise cannot
bind the employer.44
An employer that is held to statements in a manual may be
deemed to have waived a significant right-the right to terminate
the employment relationship at-will. Because waiver entails the
intentional relinquishment of a known right, the party alleged to
have waived the right must have known of, and intentionally relinquished, the right.4 5 The employer must have advised its employees, via the handbook, that the employer is expressly waiving
its legal right to discharge an employee without cause. Arguably,
this principle has been applied implicitly, if not explicitly, in cases
interpreting handbook provisions allegedly creating a Woolley
contract.
sors attended a training seminar however, at which the portion of the manual
dealing with progressive discipline was discussed. Even though the plaintiff said
she "received" the document, the court held that this did "not elevate the distribution to that contemplated under Woolley," because very few employees attended
such seminars. Id.
42 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297, 491 A.2d at 1264.
43 Id. See also Palulis v. Ethyl Petroleum Additives, Inc., Civ. No. 89-3903, slip
op. at 17-18 (D.N.J.Jan. 24, 1991) (the issue is "whether, when fairly read, passages
could reasonably be interpreted to contain a promise of continued employment so
long as plaintiff's work performance was satisfactory"); Brunner v. Abex Corp., 661
F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (D.N.J. 1986) (100-page manual did not contain promise of
continued employment).
44 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264-65 (only the "reasonable expectations of the employees," fostered by employer manual provisions, are binding). See also id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265-66 (termination provisions not binding
where a reasonable employee would not have interpreted them as such); Carney v.
Dexter Shoe Co., 701 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (D.N.J. 1988) (plaintiff's testimony that
he believed he had a secure future with the employer, based apparently on the
"comfortable working environment," is insufficient to create an employment
contract).
45 Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 291, 544 A.2d 377,
384 (1988) (citations omitted).

826

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:814

Indeed, mere aspirational statements of an employer's general philosophy or ideals clearly cannot constitute contractually
binding promises under Woolley. Rather, an explicit statement of
a specific, detailed employer policy, not undermined by any other
language in the handbook, is required to establish that the employer is clearly waiving its right to discharge without cause.
Thus, the absence of either a specific policy statement proving
that an employer has voluntarily limited its authority to discharge
employees or the existence of detailed, comprehensive, termination provisions covering all of the ways that employment may be
severed is generally fatal to a Woolley claim.
The leading case considering this aspect of Woolley is Kane v.
Milikowsy. 46 In Kane, the employer published a document entitled
"Company Rules," which set forth twenty-seven offenses that
could result in disciplinary action. The document advised employees that the first violation of all but the most serious offenses
would result only in a verbal warning, with a written warning for
a second violation and suspension after the third violation. A
fourth violation within an eighteen month period would result in
the employee's discharge. The plaintiff argued that this document, among others, created an implied promise that no employee would be terminated without cause.4 7
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, disagreed and held that the document merely identified the infractions and the consequences for violations thereof. The appellate
court observed that the Woolley manual specifically defined the
types of termination in an extensive manual section concerning
the subject of termination. This "comprehensive treatment" by
the Woolley manual, the court found, was distinguishable from the
"Company Rules" memorandum, which did not purport to be
tended as a "comprehensive" treatment of employee terminations and procedures. The court further observed that the Woolley manual expressly stated the employer's policy of "retain[ing]
to the extent consistent with company requirements, the services
of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effec46 224 N.J. Super. 613, 541 A.2d 233 (App. Div. 1988).
47 Plaintiffalso relied upon memoranda that (1) established a management committee on labor relations; (2) described various employee benefits including salary
reviews, bonuses and health benefits; and (3) announced the creation of a performance appraisal procedure for determining employee compensation each year. Id. at
615-16, 541 A.2d at 234-35. The court found no implied promise within any of
those documents.
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tively." 4 The court found that there was no similar policy statement in the memorandum relied upon by the plaintiff. Thus, the
Kane court, adhering to the parameters set by Woolley, held that
the memoranda contained neither a comprehensive treatment of
the subject of termination nor clear and specific job security provisions-key prerequisites to a Woolley contract-and therefore
no enforceable promise existed.4 9
Similarly, in Palulis v. Ethyl Petroleum Additives, Inc.,50 the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held
that, as a matter of law, a handbook that contained no comprehensive treatment of the subject of termination could not give
rise to a Woolley contract. 5 The handbook contained, inter alia, a
"pledge" which provided in part that "[w]e believe that only
through the willing efforts and teamwork of all employees can we
achieve the maximum earnings,job security, employee benefits and
52
opportunity for growth and advancement that we all desire.
The handbook also contained a two paragraph discussion of ter48 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2 (1985). See also supra note 11
and accompanying text.
49 Kane, 224 N.J. Super. at 616, 541 A.2d at 235. The detailed nature of the
termination provisions were central to the Woolley court's holding and were repeatedly noted by the court throughout its opinion. See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 287 n.2, 491
A.2d at 1259 n.2 (noting that five pages of the manual were devoted to the provisions on "termination"). The Woolley court suggested that reasonable expectations
of job security could arise when an employee was given the manual in question
because the one document contained all of the "terms and conditions of his employment." Id. at 299,491 A.2d at 1265. The court additionally observed that the document was "obviously carefully prepared by the company with all of the appearances
of corporate legitimacy that one could imagine." Id. Finally, the court noted the
"set of detailed procedures" set forth in the manual. Id. at 308, 491 A.2d at 1270.
50 Civ. No. 89-3903 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1991).
51 Id., slip op. at 19.
52 Id., slip op. at 17-18 n.5 (emphasis added). The "pledge" statement further
provided:
In recognition of these beliefs, and of the Company's responsibility to
employees:
WE PLEDGE
1. To provide earnings that will fairly compensate employees
for their work, their ability and their time.
2. To make available a soundly planned and financed benefit
program that will protect employees and their families against certain
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mination and discipline entitled "Proper Conduct."5
Judge Brown distinguished Woolley's "detailed termination
procedures" and held that the brief disciplinary provisions in the
"Proper Conduct" statement, "when fairly read," could not be
interpreted reasonably as a promise of continued employment if
the plaintiff performed satisfactorily. 54 Regarding the purely
aspirational "Pledge" provisions, the court observed that
"[o]bviously, such language is 'such that no one could reasonably
have thought it was intended to create legally binding
obligations.... '"'
The Palulis court's holding reflects a common sense acknowledgment that there is an obvious difference between an expression of goals (whether expressed as a pledge, business
philosophy, statement of principles, or the like) and an objectively manifested intent to assume a binding legal obligation.
Arguably, most employers strive to be fair and not to discharge
employees without reason. Palulis recognizes that mere communication of such an ideal in broad language, without more, canfinancial hazards of life and provide employees with retirement security.
3. To provide stable employment as far as practical to all employees.
4. To treat every employee with consideration and respect, and
to handle any complaint promptly and fairly.
5. To weigh all decisions with full regard for their effect on the
welfare of all employees.
6. To provide safe, clean and congenial working conditions and
proper equipment to help all employees do their jobs efficiently.
7. To provide employees with opportunities for self-improvement and advancement commensurate with their demonstrated ability
and effort.
Id. (emphasis added).
53 The "Proper Conduct" statement provided:
Disciplinary action may be a talk with the supervisor; [i]t may be a
formal warning; [i]t may be time off without pay; or it may be discharge. The action taken, of course, will depend upon the seriousness
of the offense.
In each case, an employee being disciplined will have an opportunity to explain actions. [Our] policy is to treat all employees fairly at
all times. This policy will always apply to situations regarding
discipline.
Id., slip op. at 16-17.
54 Id., slip op. at 18 (citation omitted). The court noted "the statement referred
to by plaintiff does not even approach the detailed termination procedures that
were involved in Woolley. Nor could these passages 'purport to cover comprehensively the subject of termination' and as such they provide no basis for an implied
promise not to terminate without cause." Id. (quoting Kane v. Milikowsky, 224 N.J.
Super. 613, 616, 541 A.2d 233, 235 (App. Div. 1988)).
55 Id., slip op. at 18 n.5 (quoting Woolley, 99 N.J. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265).
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not evidence a legal intent
to abrogate the at-will nature of the
56
relationship.
employment
In Maietta v. United Parcel Service, Inc.," the court held that
pursuant to Woolley and its progeny, a policy manual may convert
an at-will employment relationship to one of termination only for
cause only where the manual comprehensively and "clearly and
exhaustively" establishes the procedure for the employee's termination. 58 Judge Lechner further held that the manual must describe the dischargeable actions and the pre-discharge
disciplinary procedures the employer obligated itself to undertake.5 9
Similarly, courts have held that an employer's publication of
a non-exhaustive list of dischargeable offenses does not necessar56 But see Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 231 N.J. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12
(App. Div. 1989). One of the factors that the Preston court considered in determining that Claridge Hotel & Casino's handbook created a Woolley contract was "the
testimony of Claridge's Executive Director of Human Resources that it was Claridge's general policy to terminate employees only for cause..." Id. at 86, 555 A.2d
at 15. Consideration of such testimony in support of a Woolley claim is questionable
in light of Woolley's "widespread distribution" requirement. See supra notes 29-42
and accompanying text. Merely because an employer does not routinely fire employees for no reason clearly cannot constitute a waiver of the right to terminate
employment with or without cause. Indeed, even the widespread communication
of such a policy to employees would not necessarily require a finding that the employer thereby intended to waive its legal right to terminate at-will. It does not
appear that this factor was pertinent to the Preston court's decision, however, in
light of the comprehensive termination and disciplinary provisions of the handbook
as well as the numerous representations of "maximum job security" published in
the employer's manuals. Preston, 231 N.J. Super. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15.
57 749 F. Supp. 1344 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.
1991).
58 Id. at 1361.
59 Id. at 1362. Numerous other courts have held that a Woolley contract cannot
arise absent a comprehensive treatment of the subject of termination and specific
job-security provisions. See Abate v. Monroe Systems for Business, Civ. No. 852946, slip op. at 21-22 (D.N.J. May 8, 1989) (list of grounds for disciplinary action
did not imply that the list was exhaustive and cannot be construed as an implied
promise); Weber v. LDC/Milton Roy, 42 FEP Cases (BNA) 1507, 1518 (D.N.J.
1986) (manual's statement warning that employees may be discharged for any
number of reasons is not the type of "specific and detailed provisions such as those
at issue in Woolley"). See also McQuitty v. General Dynamics Corp., 204 N.J. Super.
514, 519-20, 499 A.2d 526, 528-29 (App. Div. 1985) (employer's telegram, after
expiration of labor agreement, offering reemployment to certain striking employees does not create an implied promise ofjob security under Woolley). Cf. Preston,
231 N.J. Super. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15 (enforcing handbook containing detailed stepby-step procedures for handling employee problems, a progressive discipline system, enumerating the dischargeable conduct and containing a representation that
"[w]hile you work for the [employer] . . . [y]ou will receive maximum job
security.").
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ily give rise to an implied promise to discharge only for cause. °
In Radwan v. Beecham Laboratories,6 ' the manual contained a provision that a dismissal for cause "may include, but is not limited to" six
enumerated examples. 62 Further, the manual did not proscribe
procedures for terminating an employee for cause. The plaintiff
had also signed an employment application which explicitly stipulated that the employment was at-will and could be terminated
by the employer at any time. In affirming the district court's
award of summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's
Woolley claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit that under Woolley, it is for the court to determine whether
the plaintiff could have any reasonable expectation that the manual granted him the right to be discharged only for cause.
Although the court found that the employment application provision disposed of the plaintiff's claim, the court noted that his
Woolley claim still failed because the manual's "fairly detailed
enumneration of grounds for dismissal with cause is not exclusive." Therefore, the court held, the manual did not impliedly
limit the grounds upon which the employer could terminate the
employee.
In Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc.,63 however, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, assumed on review of the
employer's motion for summary judgment that the employee
handbook was binding, even though the manual contained a list
of dischargeable offenses
that explicitly provided that the list was
"not exhaustive." 64 Unlike the manual in Radwan, the widely distributed handbook contained a pre-termination procedure, in60 Even an apparently exhaustive list may not give rise to a Woolley contract. See,
e.g., Kane v. Milikowsky, 224 NJ. Super. 613, 617-18, 541 A.2d 233, 235-36 (App.
Div. 1988) (no Woolley contract arose from list of 27 specific rules that appeared
exhaustive).
61 850 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1988).
62 Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
63 224 N.J. Super. 21, 539 A.2d 744 (App. Div. 1988).
64 Both the employer and the plaintiff apparently assumed, for purposes of appeal, that the manual's provisions were binding. Brief and Appendix for Appellant
at 16, Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 222 N.J. Super. 21, 539 A.2d 744 (App. Div.
1988); Brief and Appendix for Respondent at 15, Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 222
N.J. Super. 21, 539 A.2d 744 (App. Div. 1988). The employer's argument was simply that the plaintiff's termination was consistent with the manual's provisions.
Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 15, Schwartz v. Leasametric, Inc., 222 N.J.
Super. 21, 539 A.2d 744 (App. Div. 1988). Therefore, the appellate division simply
assumed that the manual was binding and determined there was a fact question as
to whether the employer followed the manual's termination provisions. Schwartz,
224 NJ. Super. at 31, 539 A.2d at 749-50. If the issue of whether the manual was
binding had been disputed, the appellate division arguably would have determined,
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cluding a three-step progressive disciplinary system. For
purposes of the summary judgment motion, the appellate court
determined that a fact question existed as to whether the employer followed the manual's termination provisions and, therefore, reversed the grant of summary judgment on that claim.
Claims that an implied promise of no termination without
cause can be crafted from other handbook provisions have met
with mixed success. In Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino,6 5 for example, the manuals did not explicitly state that employees could
be discharged only for just cause. The appellate court nevertheless held that manual statements that the employer intended to
provide "maximum job security," when considered together with
comprehensive termination provisions and procedures, created
an implied contract not to terminate except for cause.66
By contrast, a pledge within a manual of a corporate "climate" intended to provide employees with "job security" did not
equate to a promise of discharge for cause only.67 Nor were
statements in a manual that an employer would be "fair," "evenhanded" and "equitable" construed to create binding contractual obligations. 68 For instance, in Brunner v. Abex Corp.,69 the
court held that a company personnel manual providing that the
"broad program of employee benefits which are outlined in this
book will assist in providing security and protection for your family during your working years and beyond into retirement" did
70
not give rise to a Woolley contract.
Similarly, in Abate v. Monroe Systems for Business,71 the plaintiff
attempted to craft a reasonable expectation of "discharge for just
cause" out of several sections of the employer's handbook. One
section provided, in part, that the employer "provides equal
in light of its then-recent Kane decision, that the manual's provisions were not binding. See Kane, 224 N.J. Super. at 613, 541 A.2d at 233.
65 231 NJ. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1989).
66 Id. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15.
67 See Callahan v. Pioneer Communications of Am., No. A-3440-88T5, slip op. at
2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 17, 1989).
68 See Maietta v. United Parcel Service, 749 F. Supp. 1344, 1361-62 (D.N.J.
1990), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1991); Palulis v. Ethyl Petroleum
Additives, Civ. No. 89-3903, slip op. at 17-18 n.5 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1991); Abate v.
Monroe Systems for Business, Civ. No. 85-2946, slip op. at 21-22 (D.N.J. May 8,
1989).
69 661 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1986).
70 Id. at 1352. In so holding, the court noted that the 100-page personnel manual contained "utterly no discussion, as [opposed to the manual] in Woolley, of termination proceedings." Id.
71 Civ. No. 85-2946 (D.N.J. May 8, 1989).
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treatment of all employees concerning... discharge" and "[i]t is
our policy to provide equal employment opportunities on the basis of merit and qualifications.""7 2 The court held that a statement
of equal treatment of employees did not create a reasonable expectation that any employee would only be discharged for
73
cause.

Courts in other jurisdictions that recognize Woolley-type implied employment contracts have held that the mere listing of
possible grounds for termination in a handbook or manual does
74
not limit an employer's right to discharge employees at will.
D. Breach of Promise-DischargeWithout 'just Cause"
Perhaps the most significant issue raised by Woolley, assuming an implied contract has been formed, is the scope of the employer's obligation. The Woolley court concerned an alleged
implied contract not to discharge employees except "for
cause. ' 71 The court explained the scope of the "for cause" commitment, noting that it ony protected employees from "arbitrary" termination.76 Certain types of discharge are deemed
Abate, Civ. No. 85-2956, slip op. at 22.
Id., slip op. at 21. See also First Atlantic Leasing Corp. v. Tracey, 738 F. Supp.
863 (D.NJ. 1990). In First Atlantic Leasing, the employer had a general, company
policy of providing severance pay, but denied such to the plaintiff upon his termination. The policy was not in writing, but was apparently adhered to in most cases.
The court refused to elevate past practice into a binding contractual commitment:
"In the absence of express terms conveyed to specific employees, an employer
should not become legally bound to treat each and every employee in the same
fashion based upon past policies and practices." Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
74 See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986)
(mere listing of possible grounds for discharge does not create an implied contract
of "for cause" termination for non-listed actions because the handbook language
did not identify the acts as the exclusive grounds for discharge.); Arnold v. Diet
Center, Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (summary judgment
granted where handbook stated listing of various grounds for termination was "illustrative ... and is not intended to be all-inclusive" notwithstanding the inclusion
of a progressive discipline system in the handbook); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d
549, 556 (Okla. 1987) (summary judgment granted to employer on alleged implied
contract claim based on manual providing a non-exhaustive list of grounds for termination); McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 448 So. 2d 398, 400-01 (Ala.
1986) (affirming summary judgment for employer based on handbook listing
grounds for termination which "include, but are not limited to the following" because the provision allowed termination on grounds other than those provided);
Jones v. EG&G Idaho, Inc., 726 P.2d 703, 706 (Idaho 1986) (employee handbook
with list of dischargeable infractions, "not intended to be all inclusive," created an atwill employment relationship) (emphasis in original).
75 Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 307, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271,
modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
76 Id. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266. See also Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp.,
72
73
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non-arbitrary as a matter of law. Indeed, the Woolley court provided a non-exhaustive list of such reasons. 7
In Fried v. Aftec, Inc.,78 the court addressed the meaning of
termination "for cause" in the context of an individual employment contract which did not indicate how the parties intended to
define "for cause."' 79 The court observed that in all other New
Jersey decisions involving termination "for cause," a "special understanding" (i.e., a specific definition of the term) between the
parties existed. Such an understanding was lacking in the plaintiff's employment contract, however.
The Fried court, after reviewing the existing case law, summarized the general principles that the courts had utilized in defining "for cause." The court concluded that cause denotes "an
objective, rather than a personal, subjective test" to be viewed
from the employer's perspective. The Fried court held that, absent an agreement or definition of the term, the analysis of
whether "cause" existed required an evaluation of the employer's reason for the discharge and whether a reasonable employer, acting in good faith, could have considered the reason as
sufficient for discharging the employee."
Under this formulation, the measure of dissatisfaction is
judged from the perspective of the reasonable employer, not the
employee. While the employer cannot discharge the employee
because of a "subjective dislike or disapproval" of the employee,"' the jury could not substitute its judgment or view of the
equities for the employer's judgment.8 2
111 N.J. 276, 287, 544 A.2d 377, 382 (1988) ("a promise to discharge only for
cause .. .protects the employee only from arbitrary termination").
77 See supra note 50. See also Maietta v. United Parcel Service, 749 F. Supp. 1344,
1362-63 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1991) (misconduct provides good cause to terminate an employee); Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp., 226 NJ. Super. 74, 80, 543 A.2d 954, 957 (App. Div. 1988) (discharge
for legitimate business reason is acceptable).
78 246 NJ. Super. 245, 587 A.2d 290 (App. Div. 1991).
79 Although Fried did not concern an implied "for cause" Woolley employment
contract, the court's discussion is nevertheless interesting.
80 Id. at 257, 587 A.2d at 296 (citation omitted). The appellate court remanded
the case and directed that the issue of whether "cause" existed be left to the jury
because the parties themselves had not defined "good cause." Id. at 254, 587 A.2d
at 294.
81 Id. at 256, 587 A.2d at 295.
82 The Fried court's submission to the jury of the issue of whether the plaintiff
had been terminated "for cause" does not mean that the issue will always be a jury
question. Armed with this definition, future courts could decide as a matter of law
that good cause existed on an undisputed factual record. See, e.g., Maietta v. United
Parcel Service, 749 F. Supp. 1344, 1362 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d
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The Fried court made it clear that its opinion applied only
when the parties had provided no meaning to the phrase "for
cause." Concededly, this problem will not arise in a case alleging
violation of a Woolley contract because for an implied promise to
be created at all pursuant to an employee manual, the manual
must contain, inter alia, a comprehensive treatment of the subject
of termination. 3 Such provisions will, in virtually every case,
provide meaning to the implied promise of discharge only for
good cause. Indeed, if a court cannot determine the meaning of
an implied contract, that failure is substantial evidence that the
manual's treatment is not sufficiently comprehensive to support a
finding that its terms are binding.
In any event, under a Woolley contract the employer retains
substantial discretion in deciding when good cause exists because Woolley contracts, which create an implied promise of discharge only for cause, only prohibit arbitrary terminations.8 4 To
overcome that hurdle, the employer need merely decide, in good
85
faith and based upon credible evidence, that good cause exists.
Of course, an employer can also avoid requiring to substantiate whether "cause" exists by specifically defining the term in a
document that can create a Woolley contract. An employer may
also reserve the discretion to resolve employee misconduct on an
individual basis by so stipulating in the manual. The employer
can also expand its authority to determine what conduct constitutes "cause in any number of ways."
For example, in Vitale v. Bally's Park Place, Inc.,86 the employer's policy manual provided that "[a] single incident of misconduct, if severe enough in the judgment of management, may
960 (3d Cir. 1991) (deciding good cause issue as a matter of law). See also Woolley, 99
N.J. at 307 n.13, 491 A.2d at 1270 n.13 (court may decide issues of whether promise was created and whether good cause for the discharge existed); First Atlantic
Leasing Corp. v. Tracey, 738 F. Supp. 863, 873 (D.N.J. 1990) (entering summary
judgment on behalf of employer when the court found that cause existed for the
discharge).
83 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84 Maietta, 749 F. Supp. at 1363 (citing Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp.,
111 NJ. 276, 287, 544 A.2d 377, 382 (1988); Woolley, 99 N.J. at 301 n.8, 491 A.2d at
1266 n.8).
85 Maietta, 749 F. Supp. at 1363 (citing Vitale v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., No. A228-88T5, 1989 LEXIS 475, at *3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 5, 1989)). In Vitale,
the court noted that the manual provided that discharge "remain[ed] a management prerogative, subject only to management's opinion," because of language
stating that an employee would be fired for misconduct if such was "severe enough
in the judgment of management."
86 No. A-228-88T5, 1989 LEXIS'475 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 5, 1989).
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result in immediate discharge for just cause." 87 The court held
that while the manual created contractual rights for the employees, the plaintiff could still be terminated as long as the employer
followed the manual's termination procedures. In Vitale, the employer merely had to determine, in good faith, that there was
credible evidence to support its decision.
Similarly, in Morrison v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,88
the manual permitted immediate discharge for any act which, "in
the opinion of an appropriate ... [administrator, constituted] an

employee-induced termination." 89 Elsewhere, the manual stated
that the manual's contents were guidelines and that individual
circumstances might call for different approaches. The court
held that the employer was only required to make a reasonable
determination that cause existed because the manual gave the
employer great discretion to determine on a case by case basis
whether to discharge its employees.90
E. Breach of Other Promises Within the Manual
The termination of employment typically results in allegations of an implied employment contract. The focus, therefore,
is often on the manual's disciplinary and termination provisions.
The typical employee handbook, however, encompasses numerous subjects other than discipline and discharge, such as vacation
and holiday schedules, dress codes and the like. Because the
Woolley court found the manual's "job security" provisions to be a
determinative factor, 9 ' it is unclear to what extent employer
handbook statements on such other subjects can be read as
promises and not merely as general, descriptive guidelines.92
Id. at *2.
Civ. No. 90-1017 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991).
89 Id., slip op. at 8.
90 Id. at 20.
91 Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 300, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266,
modified, 101 N.J. 10 499 A.2d 515 (1985). The court made the job security provisions binding because the reason for doing so, namely that all other benefits would
otherwise become vulnerable, was "particularly persuasive." Id.
92 See Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143
A.2d 762 (App. Div. 1958) (employer's widely distributed severance pay rule could
constitute a binding promise). To the extent that severance pay policy may be
deemed an "employee benefit plan" pursuant to § 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002
(1988), the Anthony holding may be preempted by § 514 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (1988) (superseding "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to [certain non-exempt] employee benefit plan [3].").
87
88
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In Grigoletti v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. 013
two female plaintiffs commenced an action against their employer alleging sex
and age discrimination. The plaintiffs alleged that male employees were paid more for the same work, that the employer tolerated a sexually hostile work environment and that the employer
retaliated against one of the plaintiffs for objecting to sexual harassment. In addition to alleging that the employer had violated
the NewJersey Law Against Discrimination 9 4 (NJLAD), the plaintiffs alleged that the employer had wrongfully discharged them in
violation of the employer's personnel manual.
The appellate court conceded that the plaintiffs' contract
claims exceeded the specific holding of Woolley because the plaintiffs sought to enforce provisions of the personnel manual other
than the termination provisions. 9 5 The court observed that the
manual provided that employer harassment and gossiping were
valid and punishable grievances. Further, the manual provided
that the employer would, upon transferring an employee to a
new position, make "every effort" to ensure that the employee's
salary was commensurate with the salaries of other employees in
that position.9 6
The appellate court concluded that because the manual did
not have a disclaimer as to the enforceability of the manual's provisions, Woolley required that the court construe the provisions in
accordance with the employees' "reasonable expectations." 7
Thus, the court found no legal reason not to enforce the manual's provisions. The court observed that it was not deciding
whether the plaintiffs' claims could be sustained under Woolley, 9 a
but merely that Woolley did not bar them from bringing the claims
simply because they were not relying upon a job security
provision.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's Woolley interpretation because the supreme court found
93 226 N.J. Super. 518, 545 A.2d 185 (App. Div. 1988), modified in part, rev'd in
part and remanded, 118 N.J. 89, 570 A.2d 903 (1990).
94 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-28 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991).
95 Grigoletti, 226 N.J. Super. at 526-27, 545 A.2d at 189.

Id. at 527 n.2, 545 A.2d at 189 n.2.
Id. at 527, 545 A.2d at 189 (quoting Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at
1264).
98 Id. at 528, 545 A.2d at 191. The court, although noting an absence in the
record on which to decide, may have been contemplating the language of the provisions which, for example, only obligated the employer to employ "best efforts" to
make the salaries consistent.
96
97
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that Woolley was not to be applied retroactively.9 9 Thus, the
supreme court did not decide whether the plaintiff's claims were
cognizable under Woolley. Had the supreme court decided to apply Woolley retroactively, however, the court should not have extended the Woolley doctrine to the provisions at issue in Grigoletti
because of the significance the Woolley court found in the "job
security" provisions in the Woolley manual.' 0 0 Nevertheless, the
Grigoletti appellate court decision indicates that employers should
carefully consider the wording of all provisions in an employee
manual because, absent an appropriate disclaimer, the employer
may face unanticipated breach of contract claims.' 0 '
For example, a manual may contain the employer's express
commitment to give current employees an opportunity to apply
for vacant positions before the employer seeks applicants outside
the company. Or a manual might contain promissory language
in which the employer obligates itself to make all promotions
based strictly on merit or on seniority. In each case, an employer
might decide, for good business reasons, not to follow such provisions. The employer may then find itself in an apparent violation of its "promise" in the manual and be confronted with a
disgruntled employee alleging that the employer breached its
contractual promise. Grigoletti is a reminder that all provisions in
a manual, if explicitly limiting an employer's discretion, may be
0 2
used against the employer.
F.

Woolley and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith

In addition to alleging that a discharge violated an implied
Woolley contract, a plaintiff may also allege that the employer violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing existing
within the Woolley contract. 0 3 In this event, the plaintiff may also
99 Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 118, 570 A.2d 903,
917 (1990).
100 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266.
101 The Grigoletti manual did not contain a disclaimer. Grigoletti, 226 N.J. Super. at
527, 545 A.2d at 189.
102 An employer may prevail on such a claim by offering a good business reason
for not complying with the manual's provisions. If the manual is explicitly drafted
to remove all discretion from the employer, however, the employer may have a high
burden of proof.
103 See generally Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prod., 69 N.J. 123, 12930, 351 A.2d 349, 352 (1976) (discussing the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing); Noye v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. 238 N.J. Super. 430, 570 A.2d 12
(App. Div.), certif denied, 122 N.J. 146, 584 A.2d 218 (1990) (discussing the covenant in the context of an implied employment contract).
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seek to imply terms in addition to the plain language of a contract created under Woolley. 104 The contours of the alleged covenant are unclear, the courts having simply stated that neither
contracting party may injure the other party's rights to the benefits of the contract. 05 The implied covenant theory has been
used, however, in an attempt to defeat an employer's claim that it
had good cause to terminate an employee.' 016
That a Woolley contract contains an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was recognized in Noye v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc..° 7 In Noye, the plaintiff was terminated following allegations that he sexually harassed his female subordinate. The
plaintiff denied any harassment and contended that he was terminated without reason or an opportunity to challenge the charges,
in violation of the employer's disciplinary policy. The plaintiff
also claimed that the employer's action violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, accepted the plaintiff's argument that a Woolley contract contains an
08 The court deimplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 1
fined the covenant in the context of an employer's investigation
of alleged misconduct and the subsequent termination of an employee. The court found that it would have been proper to instruct the jury that the covenant was not breached if the
defendant "acted reasonably [and] in good faith."' 0 9
104 See Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 85 N.J. 171, 182, 425
A.2d 1057, 1062 (1981)(citations omitted) ("Arrangements embodied in a contract
may be such that the parties have impliedly agreed to certain terms and conditions
which have not been expressly stated in the written document.").
105 Id. (citations omitted); Bak-A-Lum, 69 N.J. at 129, 351 A.2d at 352 (citations
omitted).
106 See Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 570 A.2d 12 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 146, 584 A.2d 218 (1990). The concept has also been
advanced to object to allegedly arbitrary employer action under a written contract.
Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 420, 579 A.2d 1252 (App. Div. 1990).
In Nolan, the employee did not have an implied Woolley-type contract, but had
signed a written compensation agreement that was allegedly breached.
107 238 N.J. Super. 430, 570 A.2d 12 (App. Div.), certif denied, 122 N.J. 146, 584
A.2d 218 (1990).
108 Id. at 432, 579 A.2d at 13 (citing Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prod., 69
N.J. 123, 129-30, 351 A.2d 349, 352 (1976)).
109 Id. at 433, 570 A.2d at 13. The court held that:
[A] lack of good faith is implicit in a violation of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. A finding that defendant reasonably believed
the plaintiff had sexually harassed his female subordinate would necessarily bar a finding that the covenant had been violated. Defendant's good faith was not dependent upon an ultimatejury finding as to
whether or not the harassment existed.
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Because neither a Woolley contract nor the implied covenant
arising under it are breached by reasonable employer action, the
implied covenant theory is of limited use to employees when
challenging employer actions. Arguably, the Noye court erred in
finding that such an implied obligation could arise under a Woolley contract, however, because the obligation is inconsistent with
the nature of the contract considered in Woolley. The Noye court
simply decided, without any analysis, that a Woolley contract, "like
any other contract," contains an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing."t 0 The analysis set forth in Woolley, however,
undermines the Noye court's conclusory assumption.
In Woolley, the court adopted a unilateral contract analysis as
the legal basis for enforcing promises in a unilaterally promulgated employee handbook."' In the unilateral contract situation
as applied in Woolley, the "offer" made by the employer is "accepted" by the employee when the latter continues working.
There is no bargaining between the parties.
By contrast, the very nature of the implied covenant theory
requires prior bargaining to imply a promise in addition to those
expressly agreed upon because:
[U]nder general contract law terms may be implied in a contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are
necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that the
parties must have intended them and have only failed to specifically express them because of sheer inadvertence 2 or because the term was too obvious to need expression."
Because the offeror of a unilateral contract-such as a Woolley
contract-offers the contract without bargaining with the offeree, the
parties could not have intended to add other terms to the offer.
Therefore, to imply additional terms at the request of the offeree
would allow the employee to unilaterally modify the terms of the
contract. This result would constitute a contract modification and is
Id. See also Morrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at 21
(D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991) (even if a Woolley contract were found, the employer need only
have acted reasonably) (citations omitted). The appellate court in Noye also held
that even if the plaintiff had established a breach of the covenant, contract damages, but not tort damages, would lie. Noye, 238 N.J. Super. at 436, 570 A.2d at 15.
1 10 Id. at 432, 570 A.2d at 13 (citation omitted).
I II Woolley v. Hoffman La Roche, Inc. 99 N.J. 284, 302, 491 A.2d 1257, 1267,
modied, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
112 Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130, 207 A.2d 522, 530
(1965) (citations omitted). The Palisades decision was cited favorably in Onderdonk
v. Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 85 N.J. 171, 182-83, 425 A.2d 1057, 1062-63
(1981), and Bak-A-Lum, 69 N.J. at 129-30, 351 A.2d at 352.

840

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:814

a drastic extension of the unilateral contract analysis adopted in
Woolley. It remains to be seen whether the New Jersey Supreme
Court will recognize the inconsistency between the appellate court's
reasoning in Noye and the analysis in Woolley.
Even in the absence of a Woolley contract, plaintiffs have sought
to challenge employer actions under the implied covenant theory.
These claims are sometimes based on the theory that Woolley signalled the end of the employment at-will doctrine. Such claims,
however, have been uniformly rejected."'
G.

Oral Statements

The Woolley doctrine that an implied employment contract to
discharge only for cause may arise from an employee manual has
thus far not been extended to oral policy statements. Indeed, in
Brunner v. Abex Corp.," 1 the court noted that Woolley was limited
"even in its broadest interpretation" to written communications. 5 Subsequently, in Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp. ,1 6
an appellate court held that a Woolley contract could arise from "a
definitive, established, company-wide employer policy, however
expressed.""'
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed on
113 See, e.g., McQuitty v. General Dynamics Corp., 204 N.J. Super. 514, 520, 499
A.2d 526, 529 (App. Div. 1985) ("Since plaintiff was working without a contract as
an at-will employee, his argument that every contract imposes a duty of a good faith
and fair dealing is irrelevant. One cannot read additional terms into a non-existent
contract."); Id. at 520, 499 A.2d at 529. See Noye, 238 N.J. Super. at 434, 570 A.2d at
14 ("In the absence of a contract, there can be no breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing."); House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42,
55, 556 A.2d 353, 360 (App. Div.), certif denied, 117 N.J. 154, 564 A.2d 874 (1989)
(quoting Citizens State Bank of New Jersey v. Libertelli, 215 NJ. Super. 190, 194,
521 A.2d 867, 869 (App. Div. 1987) (no implied covenant restricts employer's authority to discharge at-will employees)). See also Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan
Co., 117 N.J. 539, 561, 569 A.2d 793, 804 (1990) ("A 'contentious' 'at-will' employee can be fired for a false cause or no cause at all. That firing may be unfair but
it is not illegal."); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 191, 536 A.2d
237, 238 (1988) ("An employer can fire an at-will employee for no specific reason
or simply because an employee is bothering the boss.").
114 661 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1991).
115 Id. at 1356.
116 218 N.J. Super. 111, 120, 526 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (App. Div. 1987), af'd on
other grounds, 111 N.J. 276, 544 A.2d 377 (1988).
117 Shebar, 218 N.J. Super. at 120, 526 A.2d at 1148. To the same extent that the
focus of the appellate division in Shebar was upon whether the alleged company
policy was somehow "expressed"-in the sense of whether such a policy merely
existed-its discussion misapplied, and clearly ran counter to, the supreme court's
requirement in Woolley that the employer's policy must be "widely distributed"
throughout the workforce. Indeed, the supreme court, in its own opinion in Shebar,
explicitly refocused the discussion to the issue of whether the company had "orally
communicated an established company-wide policy to its employees," as opposed
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other grounds, however, and declined to consider whether WoolLey applied to widespread oral communications of established
corporate policies.' 8
In Shebar, the plaintiff alleged that after attempting to resign
from Sanyo after accepting a position offered by a competitor, his
superior took Shebar's "resignation letter and dramatically
ripped it to shreds." The superior allegedly told Shebar that "I
will not accept your resignation. We will solve your problems."
Shebar further asserted that he was told that he had a job for the
rest of his life, and that "Sanyo had never fired, and never intended to fire, a corporate employee whose rank was manager or
above."
In reliance on these statements, Shebar agreed not to resign,
and rescinded his acceptance of the competitor's job offer. When
Shebar advised the executive recruiter, who had contacted him
concerning the competitor's job offer, of these reasons for his
decision to remain with Sanyo, the recruiter expressed surprise,
and stated that he had information that Sanyo was attempting to
replace Shebar. When Shebar advised his superior of the recruiter's statements, his superior denied their accuracy and
claimed that the recruiter was merely trying to encourage Shebar
to change jobs so that the recruiter would receive a placement
fee. Shebar accepted this explanation. Four months later, however, "Sanyo's president summoned Shebar to his office at the
end of the business day, fired him, handed him a check for severance benefits, and instructed him to clean out his desk and to
leave the premises forthwith." Shebar subsequently brought suit
against Sanyo, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract.
The trial court, citing Savarese, granted Sanyo's motion for
summary judgment on Shebar's breach of contract claim, construing "Sanyo's alleged promises as an unenforceable 'friendly
to an individual employee. Shebar, 111 N.J. at 288, 544 A.2d at 383. Again, the
mere existence of an internal company policy of limited distribution-be that distribution written or oral-will not suffice to establish a Woolley claim. Indeed, judicial
approval of Woolley claims based upon alleged widely-distributed oral policy statements for mischief (e.g., selective recall of alleged conversations) could be avoided
by adhering to the present requirement that Woolley claims be based upon a widelydistributed writing.
118 111 N.J. at 288, 544 A.2d at 383. See also Maietta v. United Parcel Service, 749
F. Supp. at 1344, 1366 (D.N.J. 1990), aft'd, 932 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[t]he
precedential value of the opinion of the appellate division in Shebar has been
mooted by the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion"). But see Labus v. Navistar Int'l
Transportation Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1053, 1062-63 (D.N.J. 1990) (predicting that
New Jersey would extend Woolley to certain oral representations of company
policy).
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assurance' of lifetime employment." The appellate division reversed, holding that the oral statements made to Shebar might be
probative of a Woolley contract, although "only if plaintiff is able
to prove that their statements constituted an accurate representation of policy which they were authorized to make."
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, but for different
reasons. The court held that Woolley was inapplicable to the
Shebar case because there was "no basis in this record for finding
an established company-wide termaintion policy."" 9 The court
also reaffirmed the vitality of Savarese, which the appellate division erroneously assumed had been abrogated by Woolley. Noting that Savarese had recognized that "lifetime" employment
contracts were "at variance with general usage and sound policy," the Supreme Court in Shebar stated that "[t]his is still so
today, given the unlikelihood of an employer promising to protect an employee from any termination of employment, and the
difficulty of determining the terms and enforcing such an
agreement."
The court affirmed the appellate division decision, however,
on the ground that plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to the existence of "a special contract with a
particular employee" to discharge only for cause. The court held
that the representations made to Shebar "were obviously intended to induce plaintiff to remain with Sanyo as Sanyo's computer sales manager and revoke his acceptance of Sony's
employment offer." The court further noted that plaintiff relied
upon these representations by giving up the Sony job opportunity, and that he gave valuable consideration for the promise of
continued employment by foregoing the Sony offer.' 2 °
The appellate court's opinion in Shebar reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Woolley decision. The dispute in
Woolley was not over whether the company had a policy of providingjob security, but whether a detailed, fully comprehensive and
thoroughly prepared company policy statement had been widely
distributed throughout a large employer's workforce. An alleged
oral description to a particular employee, or even several em119 111 NJ. at 288, 544 A.2d at 383. The supreme court's statement is curious,
given that Shebar testified that his superior told him that the company never terminated managerial employees, that such was company policy. The supreme court's
refusal to rely upon that expression of Sanyo's practice is further evidence that, in
considering Woolley claims, the supreme court focuses upon a widely-communicated
policy, not simply the existence of a policy.
120 Id. at 288-89, 544 A.2d at 383.
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ployees, is the antithesis of those prerequisites required by Woolley and its progeny.''
IV.

DEFENSES TO A WOOLLEY CLAIM

Usually an employer will defend against a Woolley employment contract claim by arguing that the manual does not meet
the requisites of a Woolley claim. Thus, the employer will argue
that: (1) the document does not contain a comprehensive treatment of the subject of termination; (2) it was not widely distributed throughout a large workforce; (3) it does not contain
provisions that could be reasonably construed by an employee as
binding; (4) the document is not, by its nature, the type to which
Woolley applies; and/or (5) that there was just cause for the discharge. Even if these arguments are unavailable or unavailing
and the court finds that the manual does create a promise, other
defenses are available.

A. Disclaimers
The supreme court suggested the primary defense to a Wool-

ley claim when the court asserted:
[I]f the employer, for whatever reason, does not want the manual to be capable of being construed by the court as a binding
contract, there are simple ways to attain that goal. All that
need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of
an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any kind
by the employer contained in the manual; that regardless of
what the manual says or provides, the employer promises
nothing and remains free to change wages and all other working conditions without having to consult anyone and without
anyone's agreement; and that the employer continues to have
the absolute power to fire anyone with or without good
22
cause. 1
Such a "disclaimer" will be enforced, as a matter of law, despite
whatever promises are contained in the manual.' 23 Arguments over
whether a disclaimer satisfies the Woolley requirements focus on (1)
121 The Shebar decision has been retroactively applied. Smith v. Squibb Corp.,
254 N.J. Super. 69, 603 A.2d 75 (App. Div. 1992), pet. for certif filed, Docket No.
34945.
122 Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271

(1985).
123 See Hedrick v. Merck & Co., No. A5720-8973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7,
1991), certif denied, No. 33299 (April 30, 1991).
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The disclaimer language in the handbook need not, of course,
exactly parrot the language suggested by Woolley. 12 4 In Morrison v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America,12 1 the disclaimer provided that
"[b]oth the Company and an employee have the right to terminate
the employment relationship at any time and for any reason, with or
without prior notice."1 26 The plaintiff argued, interalia, that the disclaimer was ineffective because it did not include an "unequivocal
statement" that the employer continued to have the "absolute
power to fire anyone with or without good cause."'' 27 The court rejected that argument and held that the manual's language providing
for termination "at any time and for any reason" was sufficient
8
under Woolley. 12
By contrast, the disclaimer provision in Preston v. Claridge Hotel
& Casino,' 29 was deemed insufficient. In Preston, the employer issued
and widely distributed a handbook and personnel policy manual
that the court found included detailed provisions concerning termination. The handbook also provided that "[w]hile you work for the
[employer]. . . [y]ou will receive maximum job security."'' ° The
handbook did not contain a statement that the terms were not to be
considered promises.
Approximately one year after the handbook was issued, the employer issued a "revised" handbook that was identical to the first
124 For example, in Hedrick, the appellate court held the following disclaimer to
be effective:
However, none of our policies, procedures or practices are to be
viewed as creating any promises or any contractual rights to employment or to the benefits of employment. Rather, they are guidelines
for effective management which are subject to change by the Company in its discretion.
It is our hope that each of our employees will find the company to
be a fulfilling place to work. Nevertheless, employment with [the
Company] is not guaranteed. This means that either the employee or
the Company may terminate the employment relationship at any time
and for any reason.
Id., slip op. at 2.
125 Civ. No. 90-1017 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991).
126 Morison, Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at 9.
127 See id., slip op. at 18.
128 Id. Indeed, the fact that the supreme court in Woolley stated that there are
"simple ways" to avoid contractual claims based on a manual suggests that the
court's immediately-following description of offered language is intended to be
read in the disjunctive, and that an employer need not utilize each of the suggestive
phrases to create an effective disclaimer.
129 231 N.J. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1989).
130 Id. at 86, 555 A.2d at 15.
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except for the addition of a disclaimer that the handbook was not to
be considered a contract.' 3 ' The court found that the disclaimer did
not indicate that the employees were subject to discharge at will and
held:
However unequivocal this language may be in informing employees that the second handbook was not to be construed as a
contract, it fails to explain the impact of the disclaimer upon
the "maximum job security" provisions contained in both
handbooks and the [personnel policy manual]. If [the employer] wished to advise its employees that they could be discharged at 32will, such a warning should have been set forth
expressly.'

In dicta, the Preston court noted that the necessity of providing a
disclaimer consistent with Woolley was "particularly compelling" because of the manner in which the second revised handbook was issued to the employees. The court observed that the first
handbook-without the disclaimer-was distributed at an orientation meeting at which all employees were told what they could expect in terms of employment and what was expected of them. The
employees were required to read the handbook and sign a form acknowledging that they could be terminated for violating the terms in
the handbook. When the revised handbook was issued, however,
the employees were not "reoriented" as to the significance of the
disclaimer.' 3 3 The court stated that because the employer did not
use straightforward language similar to that suggested in Woolley,
the employer should have explained to the employees what the dis34
claimer meant. 1
Preston suggests that the disclaimer would have been upheld if
there had not been such a contrast between the manner in which the
The disclaimer provided:
It is the policy of the Company that this handbook and the items contained, referred to, or mentioned herein, are not intended to create,
nor should be construed to constitute, a contract of employment between the Company and any one or all of its personnel. This handbook and its items are presented only as a matter of information and
direction regarding Company policy, benefits and other useful
information.
Id. at 87, 555 A.2d at 15.
131

132

Id.

Id. at 87-88, 555 A.2d at 16. When the second handbook was issued, the
employees were simply asked to read the handbook and sign an acknowledgement
form.
134 Id. at 88, 555 A.2d at 16. The court failed to note that both handbooks were
issued prior to the decision in Woolley. Moreover, the plaintiff was terminated prior
to the Woolley decision and the employer could not have followed the court's suggestion in Woolley.
133
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first and second handbooks were issued to the same employees., 3 5
Indeed, the Preston court's refusal to enforce the disclaimer is highly
questionable because the court held that the handbook created an
implied contract despite the express disclaimer that neither the
handbook nor any item "contained, referred to, or mentioned
[therein was] intended to create or should be construed to constitute, a contract of employment . .,6 No reasonable employee
could read that disclaimer and reasonably believe that the handbook
constituted a contract. Furthermore, the Preston court failed to acknowledge Woolley's directive that a manual should not be considered binding if there is "proof of the employer's intent not to be
37
bound."'
The second element of an effective disclaimer-that it be placed
in a "very prominent position"'--is also an issue that may be decided by the court as a matter of law. Woolley does not mandate
where the disclaimer should appear in the manual. "Prominence" is
clearly achieved, however, when the disclaimer appears on the first
page of text of a handbook, even if it is not the very first paragraph
of text.13 9 A disclaimer may also be effective to rebut an employee's
reliance on particular termination procedures if the disclaimer is in40
cluded within the same section discussing those procedures.
There is no requirement, however, that the print type for the disclaimer be larger than that used for other
text or that the language
14 1
be placed on its own separate page.
Woolley did not hold that its suggested disclaimer language was
135 See McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, No. A-4057-90TI,
slip op. at 3, 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 17, 1992) (acknowledgment form,
signed by plaintiff, simply stating that nothing in the handbook created an express
or implied contract of employment was sufficient to defeat Woolley claim).
136 Preston, 231 N.J. Super. at 87, 555 A.2d at 15.
137 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1270. The Preston court quoted this passage from Woolley but failed to enforce it. Preston, 231 N.J. Super. at 86, 555 A.2d at
15.
138 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
'39 Hedrick v. Merck & Co., No. A-5720-89T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7,
1991), certif. denied, No. 33299 (N.J. Apr. 30, 1991). In Hedrick, there were five separate paragraphs on the first page of the manual. The disclaimer appeared in the
third paragraph and in the second sentence of the fourth paragraph. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Hedrick v. Merck &.Co., No. A-5720-89T3, at 9 (June 22, 1990).
The plaintiff argued that placement was not sufficiently prominent and that the language was intertwined with language describing the benefits of working for the
company. Plaintiff suggested that the disclaimer should have been in bold print
on the cover of the manual or placed in a special "box."
140 See Morrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 90-1017, slip op. at 18
n.10 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 1991).
141 Id.
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the only means by which an employer can avoid being bound by
statements in a manual. To the contrary, the court's language suggested quite the opposite. The court asserted that what is desired is
"basic honesty," and that there were "simple ways" to make a handbook or manual non-binding. 42 Certainly, one way is a clear and
prominent disclaimer within the handbook itself. The court's endorsement of the use of "other similar proof of the employer's intent not to14 3be bound, however" suggests broader options for the
employer.
This aspect of Woolley, which has not been developed in the
courts to date, is of great significance because the Woolley court
spoke of the employer's intent, rather than the reasonable expectations of the employee. Presumably, the reasonable expectations of the
employee are relevant only after the manual has been construed to
be a binding contract. If the employer has indicated an intent not to
be bound by the manual's provisions, however, then the employee's
reasonable expectations should not be considered. Assume, for example, that the manual states that its provisions are only policy
guidelines that are to be applied in the employer's discretion. Even
in the absence of an explicit disclaimer, that "discretionary" language should, per Woolley, rebut the inference that the provisions of
the manual constitute a binding contract.
The Woolley court did not elaborate on what "other" proof
might negate promises in a manual. Other courts, following Woolley,
have utilized statements in other documents given to the employees
as supplying the necessary negation proof. Thus, a statement in an
application for employment precluded the plaintiff from arguing
that an implied contract existed based upon a subsequently issued
handbook.144 Similarly, where an employee signs a written employment agreement stating that the employment may be terminated at
any time, the employee cannot then rely upon a manual allegedly
45
promising job security. 1
142

Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.

143 Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1270. See also Weber v. LDC/Milton Roy, 42 FEP Cases

1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986) (manual contained disclaimer that "the [manual's] statements are in no way intended to restrict management's obligation for final interpretation of its policies and procedures").
144 Radwan v. Beecham Lab., 850 F.2d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1988).
145 See Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 135, 138, 531 A.2d 757, 758
(App. Div. 1987), certif denied, 113 N.J. 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988); see also Jevic v.
The Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., Civ. No. 89-4431, slip op. at 6-7
(D.N.J. June 6, 1991) (no implied contract can arise when plaintiff signed pre-employment statement acknowledging his at-will status).
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"Substantial Compliance"

Several courts have suggested that an employer's "substantial compliance" with the procedures in a manual is sufficient to
meet its obligations under a Woolley contract. In Ware v. Prudential
Insurance Co.,146 for example, the employee argued that, per the
employee manual, the employer was required to formally place
him on six months' probation prior to termination. The court
noted that the plaintiff's superior twice discussed the employee's
unsatisfactory conduct with the employee and subsequently gave
him a written warning that the conduct would not be tolerated.
The plaintiff was terminated almost nine months after the written
warning was given. The court noted, in dicta, that the meetings
and warning letter might have "constituted substantial compliance-with;" any pre-termination probationary requirement:
Similarly, in Mills v. Thomas & Betts Corp., '47 the court found
that the employer had "substantially followed" provisions in a
manual requiring a formal "coaching" process prior to the termination of an employee for poor performance when the employee's problems were identified in several meetings with his
48

superiors. 1

These decisions reflect a common sense approach to the enforcement of binding manual provisions. So long as the general
purpose of the manual's provisions is satisfied, an employee cannot recover simply because the manual's precise "forms" were
not observed. Again, as previously discussed, a Woolley promise
only restricts an employer from arbitrary action; employees will
not prevail because of technical breaches of an employer's
provisions.
C. Exhaustion of Internal Remedies
Where an employer manual provides for an internal grievance procedure, any Woolley claim brought pursuant to that manual may be barred if the employee has failed to invoke or exhaust
146 220 N.J. Super. 135, 531 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 355,
550 A.2d. 450 (1988).
147 Civ. No. 87-983 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1987), aft'd, No. 87-5731 (3d Cir. Mar. 11,
1988).
148 See also Vitale v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., No. A228-88T5, 1989 LEXIS 475, slip
op. at 2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. May 5, 1989) ("An examination of the record persuades us that defendant . . . substantially followed its own rules."); Schwartz v.
Leasametric, Inc., 224 N.J. Super. 21, 32, 539 A.2d 744, 750 (App. Div. 1988) (issue
is "whether [employer] adequately followed the manual's prescription.").
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that procedure.' 49 Arguably, where the grievance procedure is
the exclusive remedy for breach of the manual's promises, any
court action, at least based upon breach of contract, would seemingly be barred, even after those procedures are exhausted.
D. Revising the Handbook
An employer can defend against a Woolley claim by establishing that the handbook has been revised, in part or in whole. 5 '
Despite the Woolley court's refusal to express an opinion on
whether an employer can change a "binding" job security provision, it would seem obvious that, if an employee may "accept"
the provisions of the first manual-containing the job security
provisions-merely by continuing to work, 5 ' the same employee
similarly accepts the second manual by continuing in the
employment.
Moreover, Woolley did not resolve whether a replacement
manual, distributed among the workforce and containing a disclaimer or other evidence of the employer's intent not to be
bound, is automatically binding on an employee who claims that
he or she never received, nor even knew of, the new manual.
Woolley does not, however, require that the employer establish
that the employee in fact received a revised handbook containing
disclaimer language for the handbook to be controlling. Indeed,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Woolley found that although the
widely distributed manual had not been given to all employees, it
"covered" all of them. Further, the court found that the record
indicated that the employer intended that all the employees be
advised of its contents. 52 Thus, because the manual was widely
distributed among the workforce, its provisions were enforceable
149 Fregara v.Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 953 (D.N.J. 1991) ("If
the provisions governing job security are binding, then so too is the language concerning utilization of the grievance procedures.").
150 The Woolley court asserted:
We are aware that problems that do not ordinarily exist when collective bargaining agreements are involved may arise from the enforcement of employment manuals ....
[Piroblems may result from the
employer's explicitly reserved right unilaterally to change the manual.
We have no doubt that, generally, changes in such a manual, including changes in terms and conditions of employment, are permitted.
We express no opinion, however, on whether or to what extent they
are permitted when they adversely affect a binding job security
provision.
Woolley, 99 N.J. at 308-09, 491 A.2d at 1270-71.
151 Id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267.
152 Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265.
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even if an employee never saw the document.- 3
Therefore, under the Woolley court's reasoning, where an
employer widely distributes a new manual containing a disclaimer, although allegedly not to a particular employee who is
otherwise within the intended distribution group, the provisions
of the manual, including the disclaimer, should be enforceable
against that employee. Similarly, where the employer widely distributes replacement pages or "updates" containing disclaimer
language for an existing manual, the disclaimer should be enforceable as to all employees within the intended distribution
group, even if a particular employee claims non-receipt of the
updates.' 54
CONCLUSION

The Woolley court expressed the hope that its opinion would
not make employers reluctant to use handbooks, which the court
noted were "very helpful [labor relations] tools.' 55 The court
summarized that:
All that this opinion requires of an employer is that it be fair.
It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy
manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises
have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on
those promises. What is sought here is basic honesty ....1'
The court's admonition provides the best guidance for the employers issuing manuals, and for the employees receiving them.
The unilateral contract analysis adopted by Woolley means that the
employer remains the master of its offer contained in a manual that
is widely distributed to the workforce. So long as employers carefully consider the language utilized in the employers' manuals, both
employers and employees will know their respective responsibilities.
153 See id. at 302-04, 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1267-68, 1268 n.10 (employee need
not prove reliance upon the manual).
154 The Preston decision is not to the contrary because the Preston court held that
the disclaimer was not, under the specific circumstances of the case sufficient under
Woolley. Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 231 NJ. Super. 81, 85-87, 555 A.2d
12, 14-15 (App. Div. 1989). See also Morrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civ. No.
90-1017, slip op. at 17-18 (D.NJ. Apr. 9, 1991)("We do not read either Wooley or
Preston as requiring an employer to specifically instruct employees as to the existence and significance of a disclaimer [in a revised manual] where the disclaimer is
clear on its face and sufficiently conspicuous.").
155 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
156

Id.

